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December 6, 2019 
 
Privacy Regulations Coordinator 
California Office of the Attorney General 
300 South Spring Street, First Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90013 
 
By email: PrivacyRegulations@doj.ca.gov 
 
I am a tenured law professor at Santa Clara University School of Law, where I teach Internet 
Law. I submit these comments on the “proposed text of regulations” (the “regulations”) 
published by the California Department of Justice (DOJ) on October 11, 2019. These comments 
represent only my views and not the views of my employer or any third party.  
 
The “Average” Consumer 
 
Echoing California Civil Code 1798.185(a)(5), the regulations use the term “average consumer” 
five times (999.305(a)(2), 999.306(a)(2), 999.307(a)(2), 999.308(a)(2), and 999.315(b)). 
However, the term “average consumer” isn’t defined.  
 
The “average consumer” standard does not represent the prevailing national approach in 
consumer protection law. The FTC expressly considered the appropriate standard for measuring 
consumer confusion in its 1983 Policy Statement on Deception. In that statement, the FTC 
adopted the standard of “a consumer acting reasonably in the circumstances.” This standard has 
served consumers and the FTC well for over three decades. Among other advantages, it avoids 
the indeterminacy of defining what constitutes an “average” consumer when a business caters to 
multiple heterogeneous consumer segments. The DOJ should define the term “average 
consumer” to track the FTC’s reasonable consumer standard. 
 
999.301(s) defines a “typical consumer,” but its definition does not acknowledge either the 
“average” or “reasonable” consumer standard. The “typical consumer” definition should be 
harmonized with the “average consumer” definition and, like “average consumer,” should reflect 




Exceptions to Requests to Know 
 
999.313(c)(4) provides a list of items that pose too great a privacy/security risk if disclosed in 
response to a bogus request to know. The DOJ should consider expanding the list of 
undisclosable items that pose a heightened security risk.  
 
Verifiable Consumer Requests and Rules vs. Standards 
 
The legal requirements for verifiable consumer requests play a critical role in the CCPA. 
Businesses are legally required to honor verifiable consumer requests, but illegitimate requests 
can lead to major security violations that severely harm targeted victims. The regulations create 
legal liability for businesses in both directions: they face liability for dishonoring valid requests 
and liability for honoring some invalid requests. Because every consumer request creates 
potential legal exposure, businesses frequently will feel compelled to route consumer requests 
through customized legal review at substantial expense.  
 
The DOJ can ameliorate the need for these expensive individualized determinations by providing 
concrete and specific bright-line rules of exactly what constitutes a verifiable consumer request, 
instead of requiring businesses to conduct fact-intensive, potentially irresolute, and expensive 
evaluations of legal “standards,” such as requiring “reasonable” behavior or balancing multi-
factor tests. 
 
The regulations for verifiable consumer requests represent a mix of rules and standards. The 
portions that are “rules” are helpful. For example, 999.325(b) and (c) provide bright-line rules 
for when businesses must disclose categories and specific pieces of personal information 
(indeed, these bright-line rules ought to apply to all consumer requests). Business’ ability to rely 
on password authentication is another helpful rule. 
 
Elsewhere, the regulations adopt legal standards that will create substantial dilemmas for 
businesses trying to do the right thing. Most conspicuously, 999.323(b)(3) requires businesses to 
navigate a multi-factor test when evaluating consumer requests. The commentary in the Initial 
Statement of Reasons reinforces the imperative to get it right; the commentary says that 
“businesses have the responsibility to establish a reasonable method for verifying the identity of 
the person making the request.”  
 
999.323(b)(3)’s multi-factor test creates many scenarios where well-meaning businesses won’t 
be sure what is the right decision. Further, those circumstances lend themselves to second-
guessing by the DOJ. These dynamics will cause businesses to over-spend on these decisions. 
Thus, as a general proposition, with respect to what constitutes a “verifiable consumer request,” 
the DOJ should rely less on multi-factor tests and rely more on bright line rules. 
 
Alternatively, the DOJ can provide more bright-line safe harbors, such as those in 999.325(b) 
and (c). As just one example, the DOJ could add a safe harbor for businesses that rely on an 
opinion of counsel about the reasonableness of their actions. However, opinions of counsel are 





Two other places where the DOJ imposes standards that should be converted to bright-line rules 
or subject to bright-line safe harbors: 
 
 999.313(c)(3) says that businesses should not honor a consumer request when disclosure 
creates a “substantial, articulable, and unreasonable” security risk. All three adjectives are 
standards, not rules, and they require substantial (and expensive) expertise and judgment 
to implement properly. 
 999.325(b) and (c) require businesses to verify a consumer’s identity with a “reasonable” 
and “reasonably high” degree of certainty. 999.325(d) then requires businesses to 
determine the applicable level of scrutiny “in good faith.” While many businesses will act 
in good faith, the indeterminacy of the “good faith” standard and fear of DOJ second-
guessing will cause businesses to spend time and money preparing unnecessary 
documentation validating the good faith of their decision. 
 
Note: 999.325(a) makes a cross-reference to a subsection (g) that does not exist. 
 
999.325(b) requires some consumer requests to be made under “penalty of perjury.” In theory, 
this encourages submitters to submit only valid requests. However, will the DOJ devote any 
resources to prosecuting any perjured declarations? If not, the perjury declaration requirement 
will not adequately deter bogus requests. We’ve seen a similar dynamic with 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3), which specified the elements of proper copyright takedown notices. Per 17 U.S.C. § 
512(c)(3)(A)(vi), the takedown notice sender must declare under penalty of perjury that he or she 
is the copyright owner or its authorized representative. However, in the two decades since the 
law’s enactment, I am not aware of any perjury prosecutions for misdeclarations. Perhaps not 
surprisingly, bogus copyright takedown notices are rampant. E.g., Jennifer Urban et al, Notice 
and Takedown in Everyday Practice, Mar. 22, 2017, 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2755628. If the DOJ expects the “penalty of 
perjury” declaration to discourage bogus consumer requests, it will need to commit resources to 
enforcement. 
 
Rejecting Deletion Requests 
 
999.313(d)(1) says that an unverifiable request to delete shall be treated as a request to opt-out of 
data sales. However, like other unverifiable consumer requests, the only proper outcome should 
be to disregard it. Otherwise, unrelated third parties—including malicious actors—can disrupt a 
consumer’s relationship with a business.  
 
999.315(h) does not adequately mitigate this problem. A business can dishonor any request that 
it “has a good-faith, reasonable, and documented belief” is fraudulent. Unfortunately, there is a 
significant gap between dubious unverified requests and obviously fraudulent requests, even 
though dubious unverified requests may be pernicious. Due to 999.315(h)’s high legal standards 
and 999.313(d)(1)’s low legal standards, businesses will feel pressured to treat requests in that 




The regulations could fix this by lowering the 999.315(h) standard or raising the 999.313(d)(1) 
standard. The better approach would be to scrap the concept entirely. The DOJ has assumed, 
without any supporting empirical evidence, that deletion requests are perfectly correlated with 
consumers’ desire to opt-out of data sales. Unless and until the DOJ validates this assumption, 
the DOJ should not codify it. 
 
Applying Deletion Requests to Archival Information 
 
999.313(d)(3) says that businesses must process deletion requests on archival material upon its 
access or use. How will this work in practice? If a business wants to consult archival material for 
any reason, including for reasons that will never involve the data of consumers who have made 
deletion requests, the business must first process all prior deletion requests before doing anything 
else. This could add substantial and problematic time delays and expense to any attempts to 
access archival materials. Instead, the regulations should require businesses to process past 
deletion requests on archival materials only when the business’ engagement with the archival 
materials relates to such consumers or when the business is converting archival materials into 
active usage. 
 
“User-Enabled Privacy Controls” 
 
999.315(a) and (c) require businesses to honor opt-out signals communicated by “user-enabled 
privacy controls,” an undefined term. Unfortunately, this proposal misunderstands the 
technology in two key ways. 
 
First, though most consumers use one of only a few browser software programs, there are dozens 
or hundreds of other browser software programs in use, and new versions are constantly issued. 
Further, each software program independently decides how to indicate user preferences. 
Businesses cannot easily keep abreast of the complete universe of browsers and their 
idiosyncratic indications of consumer intent. Plus, honoring any new or changed browser signal 
takes time and money; it can’t be implemented instantly.  
 
Second, the browser software programs may ambiguously indicate consumer intent. The 
programs may give consumers a range of options, not just a binary yes/no to data sales. Or the 
program’s way of characterizing its options to consumers may not clearly specify that it governs 
data sales, or the option may cover multiple unrelated topics.  
 
Because the “user-enabled privacy controls” concept involves too much speculation about how 
browser software programs work, it’s premature for the DOJ to adopt it. If the DOJ nevertheless 
retains the concept, it should (1) precisely define “user-enabled privacy controls,” (2) implement 
a formal certification process run by the DOJ (or DOJ-approved third party certification bodies) 
to validate which precise versions of browser software programs contain a “user-enabled privacy 
control” that unambiguously indicates its users’ opt-out desires, (3) specify the technological 
details of each certified program so that businesses can accurately recognize and interpret the 







999.317(g) creates a new obligation for bigger businesses to disclose various statistics about 
consumer requests. Disclosures like these are sometimes called “transparency reports.”  
 
In general, I support transparency efforts. Transparency can encourage businesses to improve 
their behavior (because “what gets measured gets done”) and provide helpful data to researchers 
and government enforcers to identify problems with the existing laws and advocate for reform. 
 
Unfortunately, I do not see how the regulation’s transparency report obligations will advance 
those goals. The regulations aren’t likely to improve business behavior (businesses are already 
obligated to comply with the law), nor is it clear who plans to mine the disclosed data and how 
the required disclosures will be helpful to them. Meanwhile, the transparency report obligations 
impose substantial additional expenses on businesses. The fact that larger businesses might have 
better financial capacity to bear the costs doesn’t obviate the need for cost/benefit justification.  
 
The DOJ should eliminate the transparency report requirement from this version of the 
regulations and possibly reconsider it in future drafts when it’s clearer who plans to use the 
transparency reports and exactly what information those users need. If the DOJ nevertheless 
retains the requirement, it should include a phase-in requirement for businesses that newly cross 
the 4 million consumer threshold.  
 
“Aggregate Household Information” 
 




Example 2 (999.336(c)(2)) did not make sense. How can a business keep providing price 
discounts to a consumer who deletes their identifying information? 
 
Also, while the options in 999.337(b) are helpful, the validation requirements remain onerous 
overall. Many businesses, especially smaller businesses, lack precise data to take advantage of 
any of the options.  
 
A GDPR Safe Harbor 
 
In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Action, the DOJ indicates:  
 
A less stringent regulatory alternative would, among other things, allow limited 
exemption for GDPR-compliant firms. Limitations would be specific to areas where 
GDPR and CCPA conform in both standards and enforcement, subject to auditing as 
needed. This approach could achieve significant economies of scale in both private 
compliance and public regulatory costs. The Attorney General rejects this regulatory 
alternative because of key differences between the GDPR and CCPA, especially in terms 
6. 
 
of how personal information is defined and the consumer’s right to opt-out of the sale of 
personal information (which is not required in the GDPR). 
 
The GDPR offers many protections for California consumers that the CCPA does not. Thus, it’s 
likely that if consumers actually understood both laws, many California consumers would regard 
the GDPR as equal or superior to the CCPA at protecting their interests. Meanwhile, everyone—
including consumers—would benefit from the “significant economies of scale” and associated 




The following two suggestions, related to the definition of “business” in California Civil Code 
1798.140(c)(1), would help reduce unnecessary compliance costs. 
 
First, the regulations should specify that the DOJ will only enforce the CCPA against businesses 
that generate $25M revenue in California. As currently drafted, the law requires full compliance 
from out-of-state businesses that have $25M in global revenue and “do business in California” (a 
notoriously ambiguous phrase) but derive minimal or no revenue from California residents. 
 
Second, the regulations should provide a phase-in period for businesses that cross the CCPA’s 
quantitative thresholds, such as a business approaching $25M in annual revenue. Right now, the 
law functionally requires that business to implement the law before reaching the threshold so that 
it will be in compliance if revenues actually cross the threshold. However, this means the CCPA 
affects companies expressly outside its scope. To avoid this outcome, the regulations should 
specify that CCPA compliance is only required 6 or 12 months after the business crosses the 
applicable threshold. The same issue arises with the 50,000 consumer threshold in (c)(1)(B) and 
the 50% threshold in (c)(1)(C). 
 
Thank you for considering my comments. 
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